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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, X 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. 
PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented for review is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously reversed defendant's convictions on 
the ground that the trial court abused its discretion because it 
did not conduct an adequate inquiry of a prospective juror who 
had been a victim of a crime similar to that with which defendant 
was charged. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' amended opinion was issued on 
April 10, 1991, and appears in State v. Woollev, 158 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (a copy of the opinion is contained 
in the addendum). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes or rules pertinent to the question presented for review 
is contained in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Paul Edwin Woolley, was charged with two 
counts of forgery, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-501 (Supp. 1989) (R. 8-10). After a jury trial, he was 
convicted on both counts (R. 44, 72-73). The trial court 
sentenced him to two concurrent terms of zero to five years in 
the Utah State Prison (R. 125-26). 
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. That court, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the convictions 
on the ground that the trial court had abused its discretion in 
conducting jury voir dire because it had not adequately 
investigated the potential bias of a prospective juror who had 
been a victim of a crime similar to that with which defendant was 
charged. State v. Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35-41. 
The pertinent facts are set forth in the court of 
appeals' majority opinion: 
During voir dire of potential jurors in 
defendant's trial, the court, at the request 
of defendant's counsel, asked: "Are there 
those among you . . . , members of the panel, 
who have yourselves been the victim of a 
forgery or a crime involving deception or 
fraud?" Three potential jurors, Mark Hoyt, 
Chris VanLeeuwen, and James Tyler, responded 
affirmatively. Hoyt explained that his 
wallet was taken when he was in California 
and that his credit card was used. 
VanLeeuwen related that when he was in 
2 
Brazil, a thief stole his wallet and wrote 
about $5,000 worth of checks on his account. 
Similarly, Tyler explained that some of the 
checks were stolen in 1961 when he lived in 
Los Angeles and that someone had forged his 
signature on some of those checks. 
Following these responses, the trial court 
asked Hoyt, VanLeeuwen, and Tyler, as a 
group, one general follow-up question: 
Those three of you who have 
responded, recognizing that this 
is a different time and place and 
circumstance, would that experience, 
having been the victim of that type 
of a crime, affect your ability to 
be fair and impartial in this case, 
that is, would you be unable to set 
aside that experience and hear the 
evidence in this case and rule on 
the evidence based upon what you 
hear and the credibility of the 
witnesses? If you would not be 
able to do so, I want you to raise 
your hand. 
None of those questioned raised his hand. 
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial 
court requested counsel to pass the jury for 
cause. The defense refused and requested a 
sidebar conference. During the conference, 
defense counsel asked the court to remove 
Hoyt, Tyler, and VanLeeuwen because of their 
admissions to having been victims of similar 
crimes. The trial judge initially struck all 
three of the challenged jurors for cause. 
Subsequently, however, the court reinstated 
juror VanLeeuwen, explaining its action by 
stating that VanLeeuwen need not be removed 
because the forgery occurred in a foreign 
country. Defense counsel objected to the 
reinstatement of VanLeeuwen and subsequently 
removed VanLeeuwen by peremptory challenge. 
158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35-36 (footnote omitted). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO REVIEW 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY OF A PROSPECTIVE 
JUROR WHO HAD BEEN A VICTIM OF A CRIME 
SIMILAR TO THAT WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS 
CHARGED. 
The majority of the court of appeals concluded that the 
trial court abused its discretion because it did not conduct an 
adequate inquiry of a potential juror, Chris VanLeeuwen, who had 
been a victim of a crime similar to that with which defendant was 
charged. It specifically held that "a potential juror's prior 
victimization of the same crime for which the defendant is on 
trial raises an inference [of bias] such that the trial judge 
must probe the juror to insure that he or she can decide the case 
impartially despite the past victimization." Woolley, 158 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 37 (emphasis added). The majority determined that 
the trial court did not conduct sufficient investigation of 
potential bias when, after receiving affirmative responses from 
VanLeeuwen and two other prospective jurors to its question 
concerning prior victimization of a similar crime, it asked the 
single follow-up question concerning the jurors' ability to be 
impartial in light of their prior victimization. Id., at 39. 
"When comments are made which facially question a 
prospective juror's partiality or prejudice, an abuse of 
discretion may occur unless the challenged juror is removed by 
the court or counsel investigates and finds the inference 
4 
rebutted." State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989) 
(citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988)). The 
narrow question presented to the court of appeals in the instant 
case, and which caused the split in the panel, is whether a 
juror's prior victimization of a crime similar to that with which 
the defendant is charged raises an inference of bias, such that 
the more detailed investigation required under the Cobb principle 
must be pursued by the trial court. The majority of the court of 
appeals panel held that it did, and that the trial court's 
general, follow-up question concerning the jurors' ability to 
consider impartially defendant's case in light of the prior 
victimization did not constitute the probing inquiry contemplated 
under Cobb. Without discussing the significance of the 
information the trial court had received about the circumstances 
of each juror's prior victimization1, the majority criticized 
the lower court for posing the follow-up question "only to the 
group of prospective jurors who had been victims of similar 
crimes without probing each individual juror separately to 
determine the effect of the experience on the particular juror." 
1
 In its fact statement, the majority noted: 
Hoyt explained that his wallet was taken when 
he was in California and that his credit card 
was used. VanLeeuwen related that when he 
was in Brazil, a thief stole his wallet and 
wrote about $5,000 worth of checks on his 
account. Similarly, Tyler explained that 
some of his checks were stolen in 1961 when 
he lived in Los Angeles and that someone had 
forged his signature on some of those checks. 
158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35-36. 
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158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. In short, "[t]here was never a 
personalized dialogue which would have given VanLeeuwen a chance 
to express his latent feelings." Ibid. 
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that simply 
because a prospective juror has been the victim of a similar 
crime does not raise an inference of bias, and that the 
majority's holding therefore erroneously "requires prospective 
jurors to be rehabilitated before any inference of bias has even 
been established." JTci. at 44-45 (Bench, J., dissenting). 
This Court has not addressed this issue. Therefore, 
the court of appeals' holding represents a decision on an 
important question of law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). It is not clear 
that the pertinent decisions of this Court would require inquiry 
beyond that pursued here by the trial court when a prospective 
juror indicates that he or she has been a victim of a crime 
similar to that with which the defendant is charged. ££.. State 
v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (prior victims of crime 
expressed strong feelings of anger and frustration about their 
victimization and thus should have been excused for cause). 
Accordingly, the Court should grant certiorari and review the 
court of appeals' decision. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO REVIEW 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THIS 
COURT CONSIDERED AND REJECTED THE HOLDING OF 
ROSS V. OKLAHOMA, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), THAT 
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
REMOVE A PROSPECTIVE JUROR FOR CAUSE, THAT 
FAILURE DID NOT ABRIDGE THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY, SINCE THE JUROR DID NOT SIT, 
HAVING BEEN REMOVED BY A DEFENSE PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE. 
In the court of appeals, the State argued in the 
alternative that even if the trial court erred in failing to 
remove VanLeeuwen for cause, defendant was not entitled to a 
reversal because VanLeeuwen did not sit as a juror, having been 
removed by a defense peremptory challenge, and there was no 
showing that the jury that actually sat was not impartial. The 
State relied on Ross v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 81 (1988), which held 
that although the trial court erred in failing to remove a 
prospective juror for cause, that failure did not abridge the 
defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to an impartial 
jury, since the challenged juror did not sit on the jury, the 
defendant's peremptory challenge having removed him as 
effectively as if the trial court had done so. The majority of 
the court of appeals rejected this argument, explaining: 
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this 
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian 
after Ross was decided. We assume that the 
court considered Ross when deciding Gotschall 
and Julian, but chose to stay with its long-
standing rule that M[a] court commits 
prejudicial error if it forces a party to 
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a 
prospective juror who should have been 
removed for cause." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 
7 
461; see also Julian, 771 P.2d at 1064 n.ll. 
Accordingly, we assume this is still the law 
in Utah. 
Woollev, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 n.5. 
The basic flaw in the majority's rejection of Ross is 
that this Court never even mentioned Ross in either State v. 
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), or State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1989). The Court did not consider or reject Ross in 
either of those cases, and it is not clear how the automatic 
reversal error rule noted in Gotschall and followed in numerous 
decisions of this Court, see, e.g., State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 
25-27 (Utah 1984), insofar as it may be constitutionally based, 
would be affected by Ross. Therefore, in rejecting Ross, the 
court of appeals has decided an important question of law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(d), Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari to 
review the decision of the court of appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /rf^day of June, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
~7&<unjL 2*, ^3k^ 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
CODE*CO 
Provo, Utah 
State v. Woolley 
158 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 35 
ings suit against the tortfeasor] by deceit, non disc-
losure, reneging on promises, violation of industry 
custom and deliberate attempts to obfuscate." Id. at 
577. 
Finally, we are not persuaded that the analysis of 
the Arizona court is consistent with Beck. Cf. Hettwer 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 118 Idaho 
373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990) (refusing to adopt Rawlings 
approach when reviewing dismissal of third-party 
bad faith claims of party insured by same insurance 
company as tortfeasor because Rawlings involved 
imposition of a tort-based duty in a first-party 
situation). 
Cite as 
158 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Paul Edwin WOOLLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900012-CA 
FILED: April 10, 1991 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
ATTORNEYS: 
Charles F. Loyd, Jr. and Joan C. Watt, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and 
Greenwood. 
AMENDED OPINION* 
Billings, Judge: 
Defendant Paul Edwin Woolley appeals 
from his conviction of two counts of forgery, 
a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1989). Defendant 
claims the trial court committed reversible 
error by failing either to remove a juror for 
cause or to ask questions to probe his poten-
tial bias when the juror admitted he had been 
a victim of forgery. We reverse and remand 
for a new trial. 
FACTS 
During voir dire of potential jurors in def-
endant's trial, the court, at the request of 
defendant's counsel, asked: ''Are there those 
among you ... , members of the panel, who 
have yourselves been the victim of a forgery or 
a crime involving deception or fraud?" Three 
potential jurors, Mark Hoyt, Chris VanLee-
uwen, and James Tyler, responded affirmati-
vely. Hoyt explained that his wallet was taken 
„ State v7 
3 0 158 Utah A 
when he was in California and that his credit 
card was used. VanLeeuwen related that when 
he was in Brazil, a thief stole his wallet and 
wrote about $5,000 worth of checks on his 
account. Similarly, Tyler explained that some 
of his checks were stolen in 1961 when he 
lived in Los Angeles and that someone had 
forged his signature on some of those checks. 
. Following these responses, the trial court 
asked Hoyt, VanLeeuwen, and Tyler, as a 
group, one general follow-up question: 
Those three of you who have resp-
onded, recognizing that this is a 
different time and place and circu-
mstance, would that experience, 
having been the victim of that type 
of a crime, affect your ability to be 
fair and impartial in this case, that 
is, would you be unable to set aside 
that experience and hear the evid-
ence in this case and rule on the 
evidence based upon what you hear 
and the credibility of the witnesses? 
If you would not be able to do so, I 
want you to raise your hand. 
None of those questioned raised his hand. 
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial 
court requested counsel to pass the jury for 
cause. The defense refused and requested a 
sidebar conference. During the conference, 
defense counsel asked the court to remove 
Hoyt, Tyler, and VanLeeuwen because of their 
admissions to having been victims of similar 
crimes. The trial judge initially struck all three 
of the challenged jurors for cause.1 Subsequ-
ently, however, the court reinstated juror 
VanLeeuwen, explaining its action by stating 
that VanLeeuwen need not be removed 
because the forgery occurred in a foreign 
country. Defense counsel objected to the rei-
nstatement of VanLeeuwen and subsequently 
removed VanLeeuwen by peremptory chall-
enge. 
Defendant was convicted on both counts of 
forgery and was sentenced to two concurrent 
terms of zero to five years. Defendant argues 
on appeal that the court committed reversible 
error in reinstating VanLeeuwen. 
REMOVAL OF A JUROR FOR CAUSE 
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for 
cause is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. When reviewing such a ruling, we 
reverse only if the trial court has abused its 
discretion. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 
462 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Larson, 775 
P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)).* The Utah 
Supreme Court has noted, however, that the 
exercise of the trial court's discretion in sele-
cting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed 
"in light of the fact that it is a simple matter 
to obviate any problem of bias simply by 
excusing the prospective juror and selecting 
UTAH ADV 
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another.* Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533. 
536 (Utah 1981).* 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
emphasized that "it is [the trial judge's] duty 
to see that the constitutional right of .an 
accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded," 
State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319-20 (Utah 
1977), and has reversed criminal convictions 
based solely on the appearance that such right 
may have been jeopardized.4 Accordingly, trial 
courts must adequately probe a juror's pote-
ntial bias when that juror's responses or other 
facts suggest a bias. The court's discretion is 
properly exercised when deciding whether to 
dismiss a juror for cause only after this inve-
stigation takes place. 
A party is entitled to use peremptory chall-
enges to remove jurors who are not properly 
removed for cause. State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 
878, 883 (Utah 1981) ("Brooks II"); State v. 
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Utah 1977) 
("Brooks J"); Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 
1091, 1093 (Utah 1975). It is prejudicial error 
to compel a party to exercise a peremptory 
challenge to remove a prospective juror who 
should have been removed for cause. Gotsc-
hall, 782 P.2d at 461; Stare v. Julian, 111 
P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1989).* 
A. Juror Impartiality 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitu-
tion and the sixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantee a criminal def-
endant the right to a trial by an impartial jury. 
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 
1988). Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e) 
implements these constitutional mandates and 
offers guidance as to when a juror should be 
removed for cause. This rule provides in rel-
evant part: 
The challenge for cause is an obje-
ction to a particular juror and may 
be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(14) That a state of mind exists on 
the part of the juror with reference 
to the cause, or to either parly, 
which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging.... 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). 
Juror impartiality is a "mental attitude of 
appropriate indifference." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 
451 (citing Brooks I, 563 P.2d at 801). "Chief 
Justice Marshall, presiding over the trial of 
Aaron Burr in 1807, defined an impartial jury 
as one composed of persons who 'will fairly 
hear the testimony which may be offered to 
them, and bring in their verdict, according to 
that testimony, and according to the law 
arising on it.'" Srare v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 
767 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted). 
NCE REPORTS 
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In assessing whether a juror should be 
removed for cause, the supreme court has 
given the following guidance: 
Light impressions which may fairly 
be supposed to yield to the testi-
mony that may be offered; which 
may leave the mind open to a fair 
consideration of that testimony, 
constitute no sufficient objection to 
a juror; but ... those strong and 
deep impressions which will close 
the mind against the testimony that 
may be offered in opposition to 
them; which will combat that testi-
mony and resist its force, do cons-
titute a sufficient objection to him. 
Julian, 111 P. 2d at 1064-65 (citations 
omitted). 
Once a juror's impartiality has been put in 
doubt, a trial judge must investigate by further 
questions to determine if the juror has merely 
"light impressions" or impressions which are 
"strong and deep" and which will affect the 
juror's impartiality. "When comments are 
made which facially question a prospective 
juror's impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of 
discretion may occur unless the challenged 
juror is removed by the court or unless the 
court or counsel investigates and finds the 
inference rebutted." State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 
1123, 1126 (Utah 1989); see also Bishop, 735 
P.2dat451. 
The dissent concludes that the mere fact 
that a juror was the victim of the same crime 
for which the defendant is on trial does not 
raise an "inference of bias" but merely a 
"question of bias." The dissent claims, there-
fore, that under these circumstances, a trial 
judge is not required to probe the juror to 
determine whether the potential bias is merely 
a "light impression," thus allowing the juror 
to remain, or an "impression which is deep 
and strong," in which case the court should 
remove the juror for cause. 
We find no distinction in Utah case law 
between a "question of bias" and an 
"inference of bias." Furthermore, we find no 
good policy reason not to require probing to 
clarify any possible prejudice when fundame-
ntal rights are at stake. Such narrow line 
drawing would only cause confusion for trial 
judges. First, judges would be required to 
determine if there was a potential for bias. 
Next, they would have to determine whether it 
fell into the class of a "question of bias" 
where minimal investigation was required or 
an "inference of bias" where more thorough 
questioning was required. A broader and 
simpler statement of the rule actually gives 
trial judges clearer direction and more latitude 
in ferreting out potential bias. 
We agree with the dissent that a trial judge 
in the first instance conducts voir dire to 
probe for potential bias. That is what the trial 
judge did in the instant case when he asked 
the potential jurors if any of them had been a 
victim of forgery. This probe did reveal a 
"question" or an "inference" of bias on the 
part of three potential jurors. Thus, we 
believe, contrary to the dissent, that "because 
the probing revealed a potential for bias," the 
trial judge was required to address the poten-
tial bias "through rehabilitative inquiry" until 
this "inference" or "question" was rebutted. 
This is precisely what the trial judge attempted 
to do. 
Additionally, we do not understand what 
the dissent means by a "per se" inference of 
bias and reject any such nomenclature. If "per 
se" as used by the dissent means that a pote-
ntial juror's prior victimization of the same 
crime for which the defendant is on trial raises 
an inference such that the trial judge must 
probe the juror to insure that he or she can 
decide the case impartially despite the past 
victimization, we do so hold. This rule, 
however, is not appropriately categorized as a 
"per se" rule as there is no result which auto-
matically follows. If, however, "per se" as 
used by the dissent means that a potential 
juror's prior victimization creates an inference 
such that the juror's removal is mandated, we 
clearly reject such a position. We simply find, 
as did the trial judge, that the responses of the 
potential jurors that they had been victims of 
the same crime for which the defendant was 
being tried were "comments" which raised a 
facial question as to each prospective juror's 
impartiality, thus requiring further probing by 
the trial judge. 
The dissent relies heavily on the recent Utah 
Court of Appeals decision in Stare v. Jonas, 
793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) for the 
proposition that a prospective juror's prior 
victimization of the same crime with which the 
defendant is charged does not raise an infer-
ence of bias. We agree that there is some 
troublesome language in Jonas but find its 
result consistent with our conclusion in the 
instant case. In Jonas, a prospective juror 
disclosed during voir dire that she had been 
the victim of theft, the offense with which the 
defendant had been charged. The Jonas trial 
judge correctly asked the juror no less than 
ten individual follow-up questions probing 
her potential bias and her answers dispelled 
any inference of bias. Against this backdrop, 
the court of appeals found no reversible error 
when the trial court refused to remove her for 
cause. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals did 
state that the prospective juror's initial com-
ments did not raise an inference of bias such 
that the juror should have been excused for 
cause. The court based its conclusion, 
however, on the juror's responses to the trial 
court's many questions. We think the Jonas 
analysis confuses the two-part test of Cob& 
and reject it to the extent it holds that being a 
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victim of the same crime with which the def-
endant is charged does not raise an inference 
or question of bias such that the court must-
just as the Jonas court did-investigate 
further to probe the juror's ability to be fair 
and impartial. 
B. Investigation Necessary to Probe Potential 
Bias 
The level of investigation necessary once 
voir dire reveals potential juror bias will vary 
from case to case and is necessarily dependent 
on the juror's responses to the questions 
asked. Nevertheless, the exploration should 
not be merely pro forma. 
When an inference of bias is raised, the 
inference is generally not rebutted simply by a 
subsequent general statement by the juror that 
he or she can be fair and impartial. As the 
supreme court has stated, "[a] statement made 
by a juror that she intends to be fair and 
impartial loses much of its meaning in light of 
other testimony and facts which suggest a 
bias." Sfafe v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 
(quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536). Accordi-
ngly, "[t]he court, not the juror, must deter-
mine a juror's qualifications." Stare v. Jones, 
734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) (quoting Brooks 
JJ, 631 P.2d at 884). 
Utah case law is helpful in determining the 
depth of inquiry which has been sufficient to 
clarify potential juror bias. In Bailey, 605 
P.2d at 771, the defendant was charged with 
distribution of a controlled substance. At trial, 
the only witness to testify was the undercover 
police officer who made the arrest. During 
voir dire of the jury panel, prospective jurors 
were asked if they would be inclined to give 
the testimony of a police officer greater weight 
than that of a witness who was not a police 
officer. A prospective juror stated, "you can 
rely upon their testimony and their backgr-
ound to the utmost .... I would want to stand 
behind them a hundred percent." id. at 768. 
In response to this facial comment of bias, the 
trial court responded by asking only one 
question as to the juror's expressed bias. 
Being satisfied that the juror could act impa-
rtially, the court did not remove the juror for 
cause. Id. Ultimately, the defendant was 
convicted and appealed. The supreme court 
reversed and remanded, noting that the trial 
court's minimal investigation and questioning 
was insufficient to rebut the inference of bias. 
The court stated that "[t)he [trial] Court's one 
question was not sufficient to rebut this infe-
rence," adding that "the Court had insufficient 
evidence on which to base a conclusion that 
there was no bias ...." Id. 
In Jonas, 793 P.2d at 902, the trial judge ask-
ed eleven different questions in establishing the 
impartiality of a prospective juror who had been 
the victim of a theft, the crime with which the 
defendant was charged. Similarly, in Salt Lake 
City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 
ioc-7\ *h*» trial court made "signifi-
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a case involving driving under the influence of 
alcohol could remain unbiased given the fact 
that his wife had been "broadsided by a drunk 
driver." Id. at 1282. 
The depth of questioning necessary is 
further illustrated by a case very similar to the 
instant case; Brooks II, 631 P.2d at 878. Brooks 
II involved a defendant charged with 
burglary for unlawfully entering a basement 
apartment with the intent to commit theft. 
During voir dire of the jury venire, two pros-
pective jurors stated that they had been 
victims of the same or similar crimes. One 
juror responded that his home had been bur-
glarized twice. The other juror noted that she 
had been the victim of an armed robbery and 
assault in her home. Because of the possible 
biases created by this prior victimization, the 
court asked multiple questions of these two 
jurors. Both jurors indicated that they had 
strong feelings about their experiences but felt 
that they could render a fair and impartial 
verdict based on the evidence. Both jurors, 
therefore, were retained. 
On appeal, the supreme court held that the 
jurors had not been rehabilitated by the 
court's questioning and should have been 
excused for cause. See id.; see also Gotschall, 
782 P.2d at 459 (A prospective juror made 
statements that evidenced a lack of understa-
nding of the prosecution's burden of proof 
and the defendant's right not to take the 
stand. The trial judge asked the juror fourteen 
questions before determining that he need not 
be excused for cause. The supreme court aff-
irmed.); Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1123 (A prospec-
tive juror in a second-degree muider trial 
expressed strong feelings against the taking of 
human life. This juror was asked eleven que-
stions before the court determined that he 
could serve impartially. The supreme court 
affirmed.);7 Ju//an, 771 P.2d at 1061 
(Prospective juror in a trial involving charges 
of sodomy on a child made comments which 
facially indicated she was predisposed to 
believe the victims' testimony and was thus 
incapable of rendering an impartial verdict. 
This juror was asked twenty separate questions 
before the trial court decided she could act 
impartially. On appeal, the supreme court held 
that the juror had been rehabilitated.); Tuero, 
745 P.2d at 1283 (The wife of a prospective 
juror in a case involving driving under the 
influence of alcohol had been "broadsided by 
a drunk driver." The court made "significant 
efforts" to determine that this juror could 
remain unbiased. The court of appeals affi-
rmed.); Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 
967 (Utah Ct. App.) (The defendant in a trial 
involving driving under the influence of 
alcohol believed that two prospective jurors 
were partial. One juror was associated with 
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers; the other 
juror was a reserve police officer in an adjoi-
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ning city. Before these jurors were impaneled, 
they gave "substantial assurances/ by way of 
responses to "specific, detailed questioning" by 
the court, that they could be fair and impar-
tial. The court of appeals affirmed.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987). 
The dissent contends that the instant case is 
analogous to Homsby v. Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), claiming this court in 
that case held that one general question to 
prospective jurors was sufficient to detect any 
bias which would warrant removal for cause. 
See id. at 932. We disagree. Homsby did not 
focus on the issue of removal of a juror for 
cause. 
In Homsby, the plaintiff was seeking reco-
very from the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints ("L.D.S. Church") for 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he 
swerved his motorcycle to avoid colliding with 
a church-owned cow on a public highway. At 
the time of voir dire, plaintiff proposed 
several questions to the trial court regarding 
the affiliation of the prospective jurors with 
the L.D.S. Church. The trial court rejected 
these questions, stating that the religious pre-
ferences of the jurors were none of the court's 
business. Instead, the court asked one general 
question: 
Are there any of you who feel that 
you would have trouble being an 
impartial juror because of feelings 
you may have either pro or con 
with regard to the L.D.S. Church 
that you think might affect your 
ability to be a fair and impartial 
juror in this case? If so, I'd like 
you to raise your hand. 
Id. at 931-32. 
Hornsby objected to the trial court's action 
and subsequently filed an appeal, claiming 
that the trial court erred in limiting voir dire 
regarding the panel's religious affiliations. 
Accordingly, the issue on appeal, as clearly 
stated by this court, was whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to voir dire members of 
the jury panel concerning their affiliation with 
the L.D.S. Church such that the defendant 
could knowingly exercise his peremptory cha-
llenges. We found the court had erred by 
limiting voir dire. 
The dissent refers to a small portion of dicta 
in Hornsby which can be misleading when 
taken out of context: "[t]he question asked by 
the trial court was sufficient to detect any 
actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge 
for cause ...." Id. at 932. The dissent, 
however, fails to mention the following sent-
ence: "[b]ecause it is not necessary to this 
appeal, we do not decide whether the voir dire 
was sufficient to reveal circumstances of rel-
ationships that would warrant challenges for 
Voolley
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Read in its full context, we believe that Horn-
sby supports our holding today. The trial 
judge in Hornsby asked one general question 
to the jury panel regarding whether the juror's 
affiliation with the L.D.S. Church would 
affect the juror's ability to be fair and impa-
rtial. This question was designed to detect any 
potential bias which would require further 
probing. Similarly, the trial judge in the 
instant case asked the jurors' if any of them 
had been the victim of a crime similar to that 
with which the defendant was charged. In Horn-
sby, no juror responded positively and, 
therefore, there was no need to probe further 
to investigate this potential bias. In the instant 
case, however, three jurors did respond affir-
matively. The fact that the Hornsby court was 
not required to probe further when no pote-
ntial bias was detected does not relieve the 
trial court in the instant case of its duty to 
probe further when potential bias was dete-
cted. 
We now turn to the sufficiency of the trial 
court's questioning in the instant case. Atte-
mpting to rebut the potential bias created 
when three jurors admitted to being victims of 
the same crime for which the defendant was 
on trial, the trial judge simply asked: 
Those three of you who have resp-
onded, recognizing that this is a 
different time and place and circu-
mstance, would that experience, 
having been the victim of that type 
of a crime, affect your ability to be 
fair and impartial in this case, that 
is, would you be unable to set aside 
that experience and hear the evid-
ence in this case and rule on the 
evidence based upon what you hear 
and the credibility of the witnesses? 
If you would not be able to do so, I 
want you to raise your hand. 
None of the jurors raised his hand, nor were 
any allowed to make a verbal response. We 
are concerned that the one general question 
was not sufficient to rebut the potential bias 
raised by juror VanLeeuwen's comment reg-
arding his prior victimization in light of the 
fact that the court posed this question only to 
the group of prospective jurors who had been 
victims of similar crimes without probing each 
individual juror separately to determine the 
effect of the experience on the particular 
juror. There was never a personalized dialogue 
which would have given VanLeeuwen a chance 
to express his latent feelings. 
Our concern about juror VanLeeuwen is 
further compounded by the fact that the trial 
judge initially agreed to remove all three pro-
spective jurors based upon their identical 
passive responses on the grounds that they had 
been victims of the same crime and, therefore, 
could not be impartial. Once a trial judge has 
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found that a juror should be removed for 
cause, it is highly unusual for this juror to be 
reinstated without further voir dire to develop 
new facts to support the change of direction.1 
The trial judge subsequently reinstated 
VanLeeuwen on the panel, explaining his 
extraordinary action by stating that VanLee-
uwen's experience had occurred in a foreign 
country and, therefore, -would not affect his 
impartiality. The dissent relies on the second 
finding of the trial judge that VanLeeuwen 
could serve impartially. We are unpersuaded. 
The trial judge's conclusion came immediately 
after he had removed VanLeeuwen for cause, 
presumably because VanLeeuwen could not be 
fair and impartial. Subsequent to VanLee-
uwen's removal, the trial judge received no 
new information on which to logically base his 
conclusion that VanLeeuwen could act as a 
fair and impartial juror and thus should be 
reinstated. 
Additionally, there is no logical basis for 
assuming that a victim of an identical crime in 
a foreign country will be less biased. In actu-
ality, based on the meager information gath-
ered by the trial court, VanLeeuwen was obj-
ectively the most likely of the three previously 
victimized jurors to be biased. Juror Hoyt was 
the victim of theft and use of his credit card, 
not forgery. Additionally, although juror 
Tyler was the victim of an identical crime, that 
experience occurred thirty years ago in 1961. 
The remoteness of the incident suggests less 
possibility of current bias. In contrast, Van-
Leeuwen was the victim of a recent identical 
crime involving a substantial dollar amount. 
Based upon the totality of the circumstances 
involved in this voir dire, we cannot say the 
record supports a finding that VanLeeuwen 
was a fair and impartial prospective juror. 
Contrary to the statement of the dissent, we 
do not reverse this case based solely on the 
fact that only one question was asked by the 
trial judge.9 Our reversal is based on the tot-
ality of the circumstances surrounding voir 
dire. We are troubled that the three jurors 
were not questioned individually and each 
allowed to respond verbally. Additionally, 
VanLeeuwen's reinstatement was the product 
of an irregular procedure in that the trial 
judge originally removed VanLeeuwen for 
cause and then without further fact-gathering 
reversed his decision. Furthermore, we find no 
persuasive distinction between VanLeeuwen 
and the other two prospective jurors who had 
also been victims of similar crimes and who 
the trial judge presumably found could not be 
fair and impartial as he removed them for 
cause. We therefore reverse and remand for a 
new trial. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
•This opinion replaces the opinion of the same 
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1. The dissent contends that VanLeeuwen was never 
stricken for cause at the sidebar conference. The 
official jury list, however, indicates that all three 
jurors were initially removed for cause at this con-
ference. On this list, the names of jurors Hoyt, 
Tyler and VanLeeuwen are crossed out with the 
notation "for cause" written next to all three names. 
Subsequently, the notation "foreign country" was 
included next to juror VanLeeuwen's name, indic-
ating the judge felt that VanLeeuwen should be 
reinstated because his experience occurred in a 
foreign country. 
The dissent correctly states that since no record 
was made of the initial conference, "(wje must rely 
... on the subsequent reconstruction of that confer-
ence made on the record ...." Contrary to the 
dissent's assertion, however, this reconstruction 
support's defendant's view. Counsel for defendant 
reconstructed the conference as follows: 
1 believe at the end of voir dire the 
Court gave me an opportunity to—or 
the Court asked me if I had any challe-
nges, if I passed the panel for cause, 
and 1 said no and approached the bench 
and I enumerated three individuals who 
I felt should be challenged for cause. 
Those individuals were Mr. Mark Hoyt, 
Mr. Chris VanLeeuwen, and Mr. James 
Tyler, and I believe at that time the 
Court did strike the three individuals for 
cause. The bases were they were victims 
of a similar crime to Mr. Woolley's, the 
Defendant in this case. 
Shortly thereafter the Court reinstated 
Mr. VanLeeuwen indicating that because 
the crime had been perpetrated in a 
foreign country that that was a signifi-
cant difference. 
Neither the state nor the court objected to this 
reconstruction in the record below. Furthermore, the 
state does not assert a contrary view of the events in 
its brief on appeal. 
The dissent correctly notes that subsequently, the 
court did state that it "determined based on 
[VanLeeuwen's] responses, not to strike him." This 
language, however, is taken out of context as it 
refers not to the court's initial decision to remove 
VanLeeuwen but only to the court's subsequent 
final decision to leave VanLeeuwen on the panel. 
2. Previously, Utah courts have used different phr-
aseology in defining the discretion afforded a trial 
judge in dismissing a juror for cause See, e.g., 
Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 459 (motions to dismiss 
prospective jurors are within the sound discretion of 
the trial court); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 
1984) (in reviewing jury selection, some deference 
must be accorded the discretion of the trial court); 
State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983) (the 
question of the partiality of prospective jurors 
remains largely within the discretion of the trial 
court); Jenkins v. Parish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981) 
(applying the "some deference" standard); State v. 
Dixon, 560 P.2d 318 (Utah 1977) (matteir of possible 
bias or prejudice of jurors rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court); State v. Jonas, 793 
P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.denied, __P.2d__ 
(Utah 1990) (citing Gotschall as the appropriate 
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standard of review); State V. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Gotschall as the appr-
opriate standard of review). We do not believe, 
however, the different wording has actually affected 
the extent of deference afforded on appeal. 
3. Although the Jenkins court applied a "some 
deference" standard rather than the "sound discre-
tion" standard, regardless of the standard applied, 
the judge's exercise of discretion must be viewed in 
light of this factor. 
4. See, e.g., State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1989) (holding that defendant was entitled to new 
trial where prosecutor struck Hispanic juror to get 
even with defense counsel who had insisted that 
Hispanics be included on the panel); State v. Pike, 
712 P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1988) (discussing rati-
onale for presumption of prejudice where improper 
contact between jurors and witnesses or court pers-
onnel occurs). 
5. The dissent notes that in 1988, the United States 
Supreme Court held in JROSS v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
81 (1988) that as long as the jury which actually sat 
for the case was impartial, it is unimportant that 
defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge 
to excuse a prospective juror. The dissent then states 
that if we find that VanLeeuwen should have been 
removed for cause, we must reevaluate the Hewitt 
line of cases in light of Ross. 
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this 
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian after Ross 
was decided. We assume that the court consi-
dered Ross when deciding Gotschall and Julian, but 
chose to stay with its long-standing rule that "[a) 
court commits prejudicial error if it forces a party 
to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a 
prospective juror who should have been removed for 
cause." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; see also Julian, 
771 P.2d at 1064 n.ll. Accordingly, we assume this 
is still the law in Utah. 
6. This test was summarized in Cobb when the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "(wjhen comments are 
made which facially question a prospective juror's 
impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion may 
occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the 
court or unless the court or counsel investigates and 
finds the inference rebutted." Cobb, 114 P.2d at 
1126. 
7. The dissent cites Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1123, as a 
case in which the circumstances are "similar" to 
those of the instant case. The juror in Cobb referred 
to by the dissent disclosed during voir dire that she 
had known the prosecutor 15 years earlier when he 
was a senior in high school. In comparing Cobb to 
the instant case, however, the dissent fails to ackn-
owledge several important distinguishing facts. First, 
unlike our case, the juror was individually questi-
oned and asked to explain the relationship and 
whether it would affect her impartiality. Further-
more, the use of the language that the relationship 
"was not that which would warrant an inference of 
bias" is taken out of context as it comes in light of 
her answers to the questions probing her potential 
bias. Additionally, the Cobb court did not engage in 
the extraordinary practice of initially dismissing a 
juror for cause and then inexplicably reinstating him 
as did the trial court in the instant case. 
8. The initial removal of the three challenged jurors 
and subsequent reinstatement of juror VanLeeuwen 
took place during a sidebar conference outside the 
presence of the court reporter. Consequently, no 
record of this conference was made. 
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9. The dissent faults defense counsel for not asking 
for further questions to probe the potential bias of 
the three jurors, claiming that this failure constit-
uted a waiver of defendant's right to complain on 
appeal. This criticism ignores the fact that after the 
judge's questioning, counsel moved to remove all 
three jurors for cause. This motion was granted 
and, therefore, there was no logical reason for 
counsel to encourage the court to probe further at 
that time. 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
The majority concludes that the trial court 
abused its discretion because it did not make 
adequate inquiry. Either the majority is req-
uiring rehabilitative-like inquiry in all cases 
where there is only a question of potential 
bias, or it is holding for the first time that 
there is a per se inference of bias that must be 
rebutted whenever a prospective juror has 
previously been a victim of a similar crime. 
Both approaches are a departure from our 
established case law. I believe the trial court 
conducted adequate inquiry once the question 
of potential bias arose because there was no 
inference of bias or actual bias evidenced by 
prospective juror VanLeeuwen's comments. 
Further, I believe that the defendant waived 
any objection to the extent or manner of voir 
dire conducted and has therefore not preserved 
that issue for appeal; alternatively, defendant 
has not satisfied his burden on appeal to 
demonstrate that VanLeeuwen could not have 
been impartial. 
DEGREES OF "BIAS" 
There are three degrees of "bias" that may 
surface during voir dire: a question of poten-
tial bias, an inference of bias, and actual bias. 
The extent of inquiry to be conducted by a 
trial court depends on which degree of bias 
surfaces. If a prospective juror has previously 
been the victim of a similar crime, there is a 
legitimate question as to whether that experi-
ence has caused the prospective juror to 
become biased. When such a question arises, 
the trial court must probe to determine 
whether the prospective juror is, in fact, 
impartial in spite of the past experience. 
Typically this is accomplished by the trial 
court simply asking if the juror can be impa-
rtial. See, e.g., State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 
(Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 
(Utah 1990); Hornsby v. Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 
932 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If after probing the 
prospective juror's state of mind the trial 
court is satisfied that the prospective juror is 
nevertheless impartial, that is the end of the 
inquiry. 
If, on the other hand, the prospective juror, 
in response to such probing, makes comments 
that "facially question a prospective juror's 
partiality or prejudice," the court will infer 
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bias as a matter of law. Sfafe v. Cobb, 774 
P.2d 1123, 1126-28 (Utah 1989). Once an 
inference of bias occurs because of comments 
made by the prospective juror, the trial court 
must either remove the prospective juror or 
rebut the inference with further inquiry. Id. at 
1126. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 
768 (Utah 1980) (trial court failed to remove 
or inquire further of prospective juror who 
stated that he would give greater weight to 
testimony of peace officer). An inference of 
bias is rebutted when the rehabilitative inquiry 
shows that a prospective juror is "willing to 
keep an open mind and apply the law as the 
court instruct(s]/' Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1127. 
Questions of bias and inferences of bias are 
not to be confused with actual bias as evide-
nced by a prospective juror's "attitude of 
bias" or "strong feelings" that indicate the 
prospective juror has a closed mind. Once 
such strong feelings are revealed, a prospective 
juror may not sit, even if the prospective juror 
later asserts that he or she can render an 
impartial verdict. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 
473, 475 (Utah 1987) (prospective jurors knew 
the murder victim's family and expressed 
strong feelings of bias); State v. Brooks, 631 
P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (prior victims of 
crime expressed strong feelings of anger and 
frustration about their victimization); Srafe v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26-27 (Utah 1989) 
(prospective juror had strong and deep impr-
essions and would not indicate that he could 
be impartial). Obviously, if a prospective 
juror's comments indicate that he or she has a 
closed mind then he or she must be removed 
for cause and no amount of inquiry will be 
sufficient to rehabilitate. Jones, 734 P.2d at 
475. Although no claim is made that VanLe-
euwen was in fact biased, the majority never-
theless erroneously seeks to apply the actual 
bias analysis to the present case. 
The majority opinion falters because it fails 
to recognize the differences between a 
"question of potential bias" that arises because 
of a fact situation, an "inference of bias" that 
arises because of a prospective juror's com-
ments, and "actual bias" that arises when a 
juror reveals strong and deep impressions of 
bias. A prospective juror who is found to be 
impartial following the general probing that 
occurs when a question of potential bias arises 
clearly does not need to go through rehabilit-
ative inquiry in order to ensure that he or she 
will act impartially. 
The fact that a prospective juror was prev-
iously a victim of a similar crime raises a ques-
tion about potential bias which requires 
general probing into the prospective juror's 
state of mind in light of that experience. 
However, unless the prospective juror makes 
comments that facially bring into question his 
or her impartiality, there is no inference of 
bias raised, see, e.g., Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-
26, nor is there actual bias shown, see, e.g., 
Jones, 734 P.2d at 475. The trial court must 
find any inference of bias, or determine that 
actual bias exists, "based upon the juror's ex-
pressed feelings, attitudes, and opinions." 
Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 (emphasis added). 
Because the trial court did not find an infer-
ence of bias in this case, there was obviously 
no need for it to conduct further inquiry to 
rebut such an inference. 
In State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126, a pro-
spective juror indicated that she was acquai-
nted with the prosecutor. The revelation of 
this fact raised a question of potential bias 
that required additional probing. The probing 
revealed that she had known him fifteen years 
earlier when he was a senior in high school. 
He had been friends with her daughter and the 
two families had belonged to the same church 
group. When asked if her association with the 
prosecutor would have caused her to be 
swayed to his side, she responded that it 
would not. The supreme court held that the 
trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss 
the prospective juror' for cause because the 
prospective juror's answers revealed that her 
acquaintance with the prosecutor "was not the 
type of relationship that would warrant an in-
ference of bias." Id. (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the trial court asked the 
prospective jurors to raise a hand if they could 
not try the case based only on the evidence 
they heard. No hands were raised. The trial 
court also asked the panel members to raise a 
hand if there were any reasons they could not 
be impartial in deciding defendant's guilt or 
innocence. None of the jurors did. The trial 
court then questioned whether the jurors, if 
placed in the position of either the defendant 
or the State, would be satisfied by being tried 
by a juror of the panel member's frame of 
mind or attitude toward the case. Once again, 
none of the jurors gave any response indica-
ting potential bias. 
After the trial court had concluded its own 
voir dire, it invited counsel to ask their own 
questions, directed through the court. Defense 
counsel requested that the prospective jurors 
be asked if they had ever been victims of 
crimes similar to that of which the defendant 
was accused. Three answered in the affirma-
tive. The experiences of each prospective juror 
were briefly related. The trial court then asked 
all three prior victims whether they could set 
aside their prior experiences and act in a fair 
and impartial manner. 
Those three of you who have 
responded, recognizing that this is a 
different time and place and circu-
mstance, would that experience, 
having been the victim of that type 
of a crime, affect your ability to be 
fair and impartial in this case, that 
is, would you be unable to set aside 
that experience and hear the evid-
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ence in this case and rule on the 
evidence based upon what you hear 
and the credibility of the witnesses? 
If you would not be able to do so, I 
want you to raise your hand. 
(Emphasis added.) 
None of those questioned raised a hand. 
The only fault the majority finds in this case 
is that the trial court did not ask enough 
questions before concluding that VanLeeuwen 
was impartial.1 Once the trial court is satisfied 
that a prospective juror is impartial, however, 
there is no reason for it to continue with 
unnecessary questioning. The scope of the 
inquiry, is left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court because only the trial court knows 
when it is satisfied that the prospective jurors 
are impartial. See Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. See 
also State v. Gotshall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 
(Utah 1989); Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906.* The 
determination of whether or not a prospective 
juror is impartial is a factual determination 
made from the "advantaged position" of the 
trial court to determine "which persons would 
be fair and impartial jurors." Jenkins v. 
Parhsh, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981). The 
majority therefore faults the procedure used 
by the trial court in reaching its factual 
finding. I, on the other hand, believe the 
inquiry was procedurally sufficient. 
The single question asked by the trial court 
once it had heard the experiences of the three 
prior victims is similar to that asked in Hornsby, 
758 P.2d 902, wherein the trial court 
inquired: 
Are there any of you who feel that 
you would have trouble being an 
impartial juror because of feelings 
you may have either pro or con 
with regard to the L.D.S. Church 
that you think might affect your 
ability to be a fair and impartial 
juror in this easel If so, I'd like 
you to raise your hand. 
Id. at 931 (emphasis added). 
As in the present case, none of the prospe-
ctive jurors raised a hand. We recognized in 
Hornsby that one of the purposes of voir dire 
is the "detection of bias sufficient to challenge 
for cause." Id. at 932. We then held that "the 
question asked by the trial court was sufficient 
to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant 
a challenge for cause under subsection (6) [of 
Rule 47(0, Utah R. Civ. P.]." Id. (emphasis 
added).3 The majority asserts that one ques-
tion was not sufficient and relies upon Bailey, 
605 P.2d 768 and Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884. 
Bailey and Brooks, however, apply only when 
there is a strong inference of bias, and that is 
not the case before us. 
The question asked in the present case 
cannot be distinguished from that asked in 
Hornsby. The majority fails to show any 
defect at all in the question asked.4 Nor does 
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it put forth any additional questions that 
should have been asked.5 Instead, it relies only 
upon the total number of questions asked in 
the cases that it cites as support without any 
analysis of the substance of those questions.* 
An examination of many of those cases reveals 
that the higher number of questions resulted 
not from rehabilitative questioning, but from 
the prospective jurors giving equivocal answers 
when asked if they could be impartial.7 
In the present case, the prospective jurors' 
answers were unequivocal and therefore did 
not require any additional inquiry. Absent 
some explanation as to why the inquiry con-
ducted by the trial court was insufficient, we 
may not say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in not inquiring further. We certa-
inly may not declare the trial court's finding 
to be clearly erroneous simply because it did 
not first ask a magical number of questions. 
Another distinction that should be drawn 
between the present case and the cases relied 
upon by the majority is that in many of those 
cases counsel, not the trial court, conducted 
the extended inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Julian, 
111 P.2d 1061, 1065-66 (Utah 1989) (defense 
counsel asked the twenty questions referred to 
by the majority, not the trial court). Rule 
18(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides counsel an opportunity to ask addi-
tional questions with leave of the trial court. 
Defense counsel in the present case requested 
the question regarding prior victimization, but 
did not request any additional probing once 
the victimization question and the trial court's 
follow-up question regarding impartiality 
were asked. Defendant's failure to object to 
the extent of the voir dire conducted by the 
trial court "constitutes a waiver and bars 
inquiry into the bias question." State v. 
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988) 
(defendant's evidence of juror bias discovered 
post-trial was properly refused by trial court 
in motion for new trial when "quite foresee-
able" issue of potential bias was not raised by 
defendant during voir dire). See also State v. 
Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (trial 
court failed to inquire of jurors whether there 
would be prejudice in their minds because the 
case involved a motorcycle club; defense 
counsel's failure to object, to remind the 
judge of the oversight, to make a new request, 
or to ask personally to voir dire the jury, 
effectively waived the error). Defendant has 
therefore not preserved the issue for appeal.* 
See Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff waived any objection 
at trial when it did not attempt to call the 
court's attention to a specific question it 
desired the court to ask on voir dire and 
thereby did not preserve the issue for appeal). 
Even if defendant had preserved the issue 
for appeal, he failed to meet his burden of 
proof on appeal. "Defendant did not demon-
strate on the trial record, or on appeal, that 
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[the prospective juror] could not act in a fair 
and impartial manner."' Layton City v. 
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (citing Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884). See also 
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 
S.Ct. 2273, 2277 (1988) (defendant "failed to 
establish that the jury was not impartiar). 
Nor has defendant demonstrated that he was 
not "afforded an adequate opportunity to gain 
the information necessary to evaluate" Van-
Leeuwen. Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. "The 
trial court abuses its discretion when, 
'considering the totality of the questioning, 
counsel [is not] afforded an adequate oppor-
tunity to gain the information necessary to 
evaluate jurors.'" Id. (quoting Bishop, 753 
P.2d at 448). Defendant has simply failed to 
show how VanLeeuwen was partial, or how he 
was prevented in any way from gaining suffi-
cient information about VanLeeuwen to know 
whether he was partial. 
The majority cannot say that the trial court 
did not conduct adequate inquiry simply 
because it might have conducted more. Once 
the trial court was satisfied that the prospec-
tive jurors were impartial, it did not need to 
probe any further. If defense counsel was not 
satisfied that the prior victims were impartial, 
then it should have requested additional 
probing.9 The trial court therefore did not 
abuse its discretion in asking only one ques-
tion when the question asked was "sufficient 
to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant 
a challenge for cause." Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 
932 (emphasis added). 
PER SE INFERENCE OF BIAS 
Since VanLeeuwen made no comments to 
call into question his impartiality, no inference 
of bias was raised under our traditional anal-
ysis. Bias is only inferred when the "comments" 
of the prospective juror raise a facial ques-
tion as to the prospective juror's partiality. 
Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126 (emphasis added). Ac-
cord Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26 (fact that 
prospective juror had prior involvement in 
drug abuse and distribution investigations did 
not create an inference of bias where no 
comments were made to call into question his 
impartiality).10 The majority's ruling expressly 
requires trial courts to rebut an inference of 
bias whenever the court learns of prior victi-
mization. The majority's ruling therefore 
creates a per se inference of bias that attaches 
automatically whenever a prospective juror is 
a prior victim of a similar crime. The majority 
fails to provide any legal or public policy 
support for such a ruling. The majority's 
approach, in fact, is contrary to our case law." 
A recent decision from this court indicates 
that prior victimization of a similar crime does 
not, per se, raise an inference of bias. In State 
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, 
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), a prospe-
ctive juror revealed during voir dire that she 
had recently been the victim of a theft invol-
ving approximately $13,000 worth of tools. 
When asked whether the previous theft would 
affect her impartiality, the prospective juror 
answered, "If it was tools, I might be a little 
influenced." Id. at 906. She equivocated 
further by admitting that it was "a little hard 
to say" whether the prior incident would affect 
her ability to be impartial, but eventually 
affirmed her ability to remain impartial upon 
further questioning by the trial court. Id. This 
court held that no inference of bias was 
demonstrated by the voir dire questioning 
because, although the prospective juror expr-
essed some equivocation, she ultimately man-
ifested her ability to be impartial. Id. at 907. 
This court reasoned that since the case did not 
involve tools, "it could be inferred that the 
prior experience would not influence her at 
all." Id. Such reasoning reveals that prior 
victimization does not automatically raise a 
per se inference of bias that must be rebutted. 
See State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 589 P.2d 5, 
13-14 (1978); State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 
402 A.2d 203,207 (1979). 
The majority summarily assumes, however, 
as a matter of law and in a technical fashion, 
that all prior victims are not indifferent to the 
case before them. "'Impartiality* is not a 
technical conception but is a state of mind; it 
is a mental attitude of appropriate indiffer-
ence." State v. Brooks, 565 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah 1977). If the prior victimization of the 
prospective juror in Jonas did not prevent her 
from being indifferent, then there is no reason 
to assume that VanLeeuwen's prior victimiz-
ation prevented him from being indifferent. In 
general, prospective jurors who affirm their 
impartiality are presumed to be impartial 
unless proven otherwise. See State v. Dixon, 
560 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1977) (when prospe-
ctive jurors "gave their word that they had no 
such bias or prejudice but could act as fair 
jurors[,J [i]t is to be assumed that they were 
not swearing falsely and that they believed 
they could act as conscientious arbiters in the 
case."). 
Victimization of minor crimes is an unfor-
tunate part of living in today's society. I do 
not believe that the risk of universal bias 
among prior victims is so great that it warr-
ants a per se inference of bias that must aut-
omatically be rebutted in each and every case. 
In a great majority of the cases, a general 
probing, such as the probing conducted by the 
trial court in this case, will be sufficient to 
reveal those prior victims who might not be 
impartial. The majority's ruling will therefore 
create a significant burden upon our trial 
courts without creating any real benefit. 
CONCLUSION 
1 respectfully dissent from the majority's 
holding because it requires prospective jurors 
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to be rehabilitated before any inference of bias 
has even been established. I view the trial 
court's decision to have been a factual deter-
mination that VanLeeuwen was impartial and 
therefore was capable of sitting on the jury 
without any rehabilitative inquiry. Inasmuch 
as VanLeeuwen said nothing that would faci-
ally challenge his impartiality, we should give 
the trial court's factual determination the 
deference it deserves. 
The majority asserts that the approach rec-
ognized in this dissent would be difficult to 
administer. Let me summarize the approach in 
its simplest terms. When facts raise a question 
of whether a prospective juror may be biased, 
the trial court must probe until it is satisfied 
that the prospective juror is in fact impartial. 
If a prospective juror makes comments that 
show he or she is probably biased, then the 
trial court must ask questions to rebut that 
inference. If a prospective juror makes com-
ments that reveal strong and deep impressions 
of bias, no rehabilitative inquiry is needed-
that juror must be removed. I believe this 
approach is much simpler and gives more 
guidance to our trial courts than simply saying 
that the amount of inquiry needed will vary 
from case to case and in this case it just 
simply was not enough. 
I also believe that this issue was not prop-
erly preserved for appeal and that, even if it 
was, defendant has failed to meet his burden 
of showing that VanLeeuwen could not have 
acted in a fair and impartial manner or that he 
was prevented from obtaining enough infor-
mation to make that determination.12 
I would therefore affirm. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. The majority claims that the record does not 
support a finding that VanLeeuwen was a fair and 
impartial juror. The burden of challenging this 
factual finding, however, has not been met by def-
endant. "In the absence of a record or transcript 
supporting defendant's factual contentions on 
appeal, and upon defendant's failure to marshal 
evidence that shows the ruling to be clearly erron-
eous, we presume that the ruling is adequately sup-
ported by the clear weight of the evidence." State v. 
Christoffcrson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (citations omitted). 
Even if the defendant were to marshal the evid-
ence in support of the trial court's finding-
which includes the four affirmative, unequivocal 
responses by VanLeeuwen that he could be impartial-
-there is no evidence of bias on the record to show 
that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. 
The majority is therefore left to attack the proce-
dure used by the trial court in order to show any 
abuse of discretion. In addition to its concerns 
about the extent of the inquiry, the majority indic-
ates that it is bothered by the fact there was no 
individualized questioning of the three prospective 
jurors, but it offers no precedent or analysis to 
support its assertion that individualized questioning 
is required. In the past, this court has accepted 
collective questioning without comment. See, e.g., 
Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931. 
2. Contrary to the majority's assertion in its second 
footnote, there is a real distinction between the 
phraseology used in expressing the appropriate sta-
ndard of review. If a matter is within the "sound 
discretion" of a trial court, then the appellate courts 
will give maximum deference to the trial court's 
determination. The granting of only "some defer-
ence" is obviously a more searching review. The 
majority claims to be giving maximum deference 
when in fact it is granting only "some deference," if 
that much, to the trial court's determination of the 
appropriate scope of voir dire. Inasmuch as Gotsc-
hall is the most recent Utah Supreme Court case, I 
believe that the "sound discretion" standard enunc-
iated therein governs our review in this case and that 
the majority's departure therefrom is error. 
3. The majority erroneously describes this statement 
as dicta. At issue in Hornsby was whether the voir 
dire was sufficient with regards to the prospective 
jurors' feelings toward the L.D.S. Church. Voir 
dire has two functions, "the detection of bias suffi-
cient to challenge for cause," and "the collection of 
data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory 
challenge." State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 
1983). In Hornsby, we first reviewed the detection 
of bias issue and found that the single question was 
sufficient to detect bias for purposes of subsection 
(6) of Rule 47(Q. We did not consider "whether the 
voir dire was sufficient to reveal circumstances or 
relationships that would warrant challenges for 
cause under other subsections of Rule 47(0," 
because that issue was not necessary to the appeal. 
Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added). 
Instead, we reversed the case because the voir dire 
was insufficient to permit the plaintiff an opportu-
nity to collect data for the informed use of the 
peremptory challenge. The majority's partial quote 
is therefore misleading because it implies that we did 
not make any decision relating to challenges for 
cause, when in fact we expressly made such a ruling 
under subsection (6). 
4. The majority attempts to distinguish Hornsby by 
pointing out that there were no affirmative respo-
nses to the general question asked in Hornsby while 
there were positive responses in the present case. 
The majority's analysis, however, ignores the fact 
that the ultimate issue of impartiality addressed by 
one question in Hornsby was addressed by two 
questions in this case. The Hornsby court asked if 
the prospective jurors had any feelings toward the 
L.D.S. Church that would prevent them from being 
impartial. If the Hornsby court had broken this 
question into two parts and first asked, "does any 
prospective juror have feelings towards the L.D.S. 
Church," it probably would have received affirma-
tive responses. Conversely, had the trial court in the 
present case asked the single question, "have any of 
you been the victim of a similar crime that would 
prevent you from being impartial," it would not 
have received any affirmative responses. The inter-
mediate positive response, that the majority claims 
distinguishes this case from Hornsby, simply is not 
determinative because the ultimate response was the 
same-the prospective jurors would be impartial. 
5. The trial court had already asked three different 
questions designed to elicit any bias before the issue 
of prior victimization even arose in this case. Inas-
much as we must look at the "totality" of the voir 
dire in order to determine whether a trial court has 
abused its discretion, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
448 (Utah 1988), the majority errs in not considering 
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the impact of these previous questions as well. 
When the totality of the voir dire is considered, it is 
clear that the three questions initially asked by the 
trial court, plus the question following the discovery 
of the prior victimization, were "sufficient to detect 
any actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge for 
cause." Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. 
6. In general, the types of questions fall into three 
groups: (1) factual questions regarding the prospe-
ctive juror's experiences; (2) questions probing the 
prospective juror's self-perceived state of mind 
and whether those experiences would affect his or 
her ability to act impartially; and (3) questions reb-
utting inferences of bias by inquiring whether the 
prospective juror understands his or her role and is 
willing to be impartial. The majority fails to cons-
ider whether the questions asked in the cases cited 
are factual, probing, or rehabilitative. Absent such 
analysis, the cases cited are useless in determining 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in the 
present case. 
7. The following voir dire colloquy between the trial 
court and a prospective juror in Jonas is a prime 
example of extended inquiry due to equivocal 
answers. 
THE COURT: All right. I almost hate 
to ask this question, but I'm obligated 
to. Have any of you been the victims of 
a theft? And that, as I've indicated to 
you before what a theft really is, taking 
property of another with intent to per-
manently deprive them, or in receiving. 
Well, we'll take that first. I saw some 
hands go up in the jury box .... 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
Yes, my husband had about SI3,000 
worth of tools stolen about a year and a 
half ago which we have never-
THE COURT: Did a criminal act 
result from that-or action? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
No, it was reported to the police, which 
they didn't do anything about, and we 
still have never gotten— 
THE COURT: They didn't find it? 
PROSPECTIVE JVROR D. SMITH: 
(shook head from side to side) 
THE COURT: How long ago was 
that? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
About a year and a half ago. 
THE COURT: Keeping that incident 
in mind, as I indicated, there are diffe-
rent parties involved, but sometimes 
based on our experience we allow that to 
interfere with our thinking. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
It might be. If it was tools, I might be a 
little influenced. 
THE COURT: Well, wait just a 
minute. Let me ask the questions and 
you just answer the question. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
All right. 
THE COURT: Bearing that in mind, 
do you believe that that incident would 
make it difficult for you to be fair and 
impartial, particularly to this Defendant, 
a well as the people of the state of 
Utah? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
It's a little hard to say. 
THE COURT: Well, you just take 
time to think it over because w e -
you're the one that-
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
It probably would, yes. 
THE COURT: Let's see. You're Mrs.-
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
Smith, Donna Smith. 
THE COURT: You don't believe that 
you could set those facts aside and make 
a determination on the evidence that's 
presented in this case? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: 
I-well, yes, I believe I could be 
impartial. 
Jonas, 793 P.2d at 905-06. 
8. Contrary to the majority's assertion that the 
motion to strike was granted as to all three prior 
victims, and therefore defense counsel did not need 
to ask for further probing to preserve the issue, the 
record reveals that Hoyt and Tyler were removed, 
but that VanLeeuwen was never removed. 
No record was made of the actual sidebar confe-
rence at which time defendant claims VanLeeuwen 
was removed and reinstated, but the conference was 
later reconstructed on the record. We must therefore 
rely upon the subsequent reconstruction of that 
conference made on the record. State v. Suarez, 793 
P.2d 934, 936 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)) Defense 
counsel rehearsed how it had made a motion to 
remove Hoyt, Tyler and VanLeeuwen and then 
stated: "I believe at that time the Court did strike 
the three individuals for cause .... Shortly thereafter 
the Court reinstated Mr. VanLeeuwen ...." The trial 
court stated that it was the court's view at the 
sidebar conference that all three prospective jurors 
could be fair and impartial and that the state's 
objection to striking VanLeeuwen was particularly 
well taken because his experience occurred in a 
foreign country. The trial court then indicated that 
at sidebar it "determined based on his resj>onses not 
to strike him." (Emphasis added). Defence counsel 
did not make any protest to the trial court's asser-
tion that it did not strike VanLeeuwen. 
Defense counsel's statement that VanLeeuwen 
was stricken and latei reinstated is without any 
support in the transcript and is directly contrary to 
the trial court's express declaration that it did not 
strike VanLeeuwen. Defense counsel therefore did 
not preserve the issues of insufficient inquiry or the 
alleged irregular "reinstatement" of VanLeeuwen. 
See id. The only issue properly preserved for appeal 
is the question of whether VanLeeuwen should have 
been dismissed for cause based on the answers given. 
9. Had defendant so requested, additional questions 
could have been posed to the three prospective 
jurors after defendant made its request to strike for 
cause and before the trial court ruled on the motion. 
See, e.g., Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; Sah Lake City 
v. Tuero, 758 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
10. The majority misconstrues "comments" as 
meaning VanLeeuwen's statement that he was a 
prior victim. Such an interpretation is clearly not 
consistent with the analysis of Brooks. "Whenever 
the voir dire evokes a strong emotional response, 
there is posed a warning that the juror may not have 
the appropriate indifference to the parly or cause 
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before the court/* Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 
(emphasis added). VanLeeuwen's response in this 
case obviously was not a "strong emotional resp-
onse." 
The majority also misconstrues the language of 
Cobb by asserting that the inference that arises from 
prior victimization must be rebutted, but that the 
prospective juror need not necessarily be removed. 
Such an approach is a clear departure from Cobb, 
which requires the prospective juror to be removed 
if an inference of bias is not rebutted. Cobb, 774 
P.2datI126. 
11. The majority's approach is also contrary to our 
established rules of procedure. Fact situations that 
raise a concern serious enough to create a per se 
inference of bias are enumerated in rule 18(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prior victimiz-
ation is not one of those per se grounds. Rule 
18(e)(4), for example, provides that the following 
fact situations automatically constitute grounds for 
removing a prospective juror: 
the existence of any social, legal, busi-
ness, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any 
party, witness or person alleged to have 
been victimized or injured by the defe-
ndant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable 
minds that the prospective juror would 
be unable or unwilling to return a 
verdict which would be free of favori-
tism. 
12. The majority fails to adequately address an alt-
ernative basis for affirmance that has been properly 
raised and is before us. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988). Van-
Leeuwen did not sit as a juror, but was removed on 
a peremptory challenge by defendant. The law in 
this jurisdiction has historically been that it is prej-
udicial error for the trial court "to compel a party 
to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a juror 
who should have been removed for cause." Hewitt, 
689 P.2d at 25. The State urges that if this court 
finds that VanLeeuwen should have been removed 
for cause, as the majority does, then we must reev-
aluate the Hewitt line of cases in light of the recent 
case of Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 
2273 (1988). The United States Supreme Court held 
therein that where a juror who should have been 
excused for cause was removed by defendant's 
peremptory challenge, "[a]ny claim that the jury was 
not impartial was required to focus, not on [the 
excused juror J, but on the jurors who ultimately 
sat." 108 S.Ct. at 2277. The Supreme Court reas-
oned that as long as the jury which actually sat for 
the case was impartial, it was unimportant that 
defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge 
to excuse a prospective juror. 108 S.Ct. at 2278 
(citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436, 7 S.Ct. 
614,616(1887)). 
In view of the majority's reversal, this alternative 
argument deserves discussion. The majority errone-
ously "assumes" that this issue has been considered 
by the Utah Supreme Court since it has decided two 
juror removal cases subsequent to the Ross decision 
being issued by the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as 
appellate courts are limited to the issues properly 
raised on appeal, the majority's assumption is unf-
ounded. Since the Utah Supreme Court has never 
addressed this issue directly, the majority's ruling 
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places it squarely before us now. 
